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 NOTE 
Technology or Privacy: Should You Really 
Have to Choose Only One? 
Callie Haslag* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Today’s society has both the blessing and the curse of having access to a 
vast range of technologies.  A person can be diagnosed by doctors while video-
chatting from his or her own home, communicate with someone located on the 
other side of the world instantaneously, or monitor his or her home through 
enhanced security systems.  It is even possible to give simple commands, like 
“Turn on the lights” or “Play my favorite song,” and a home assistant device, 
such as the Amazon Echo, will complete the given task.  While these technol-
ogies offer many blessings, there are potential downsides that accompany their 
presence. 
People are currently living in the Information Age, where devices record 
and collect data based on their personal information.1  This data is often stored 
by third parties, including, but not limited to, internet service providers, phone 
companies, websites, and merchants.2  This data is used for different purposes, 
but most is used for advertising and learning a user’s preferences.3  However, 
this information can also be made available to the government – specifically 
for law enforcement’s use.4  The data collected by these third parties provides 
detailed records as to an “individual’s reading materials, purchases, diseases, 
and website activity,” which “enable[s] the government to assemble a profile 
of an individual’s finances, health, psychology, beliefs, politics, interests, and 
lifestyle.”5  Therefore, the government could know more about a person than 
even his or her closest family members and friends. 
One of the latest technologies taking hold across America is the smart 
home device.  These devices include products such as Amazon’s Echo, Nest’s 
connected home devices, smart home security systems, smart water meters, and 
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Missouri Law Review, 2017-2018.  I am grateful to Professor Desnoyer for his insight, 
guidance, and support during the writing of this Note, as well as the Missouri Law 
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 1. Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment 
Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1084 (2002). 
 2. Id. at 1084. 
 3. See id. at 1141–42. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 1084. 
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even refrigerators with interior cameras that broadcast directly to a person’s 
phone.  These devices monitor and record data from users’ homes, which is 
then stored by the third parties providing the services.6  This data, while ap-
pearing to be under a user’s sole control, can be used by the third-party service 
provider.7  Law enforcement agencies seek to access the data held by third-
party service providers to collect private information about individuals when 
investigating crimes like drug trafficking, white-collar offenses, cyber miscon-
duct, and even more serious crimes, like murder.8 
For example, in November of 2015, law enforcement requested that Am-
azon turn over data it collected from an Amazon Echo, which was located in a 
home where a death occurred.9  Amazon refused.10  Despite the fact that the 
police secured a search warrant, Amazon refused the request on privacy 
grounds, stating it would not release customer information “without a valid and 
binding legal demand properly served.”11  Amazon also objected to what it felt 
were “overbroad or otherwise inappropriate demands.”12  Eventually, Amazon 
turned over the data; however, it did so only after the Echo owner, and sus-
pected murderer, gave consent.13  As there are currently few standards for how 
smart home devices should be treated under the law, this Note explores existing 
case law to assess and articulate how the government should treat the data these 
devices collect. 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
There are two main areas of law surrounding the issue of privacy and 
technology: privacy law and the third-party doctrine. 
A. The Fourth Amendment and Early Privacy Law 
Privacy law is complicated because it must evolve to address ever-chang-
ing technology to protect the fundamental rights that have existed since our 
nation’s founding.  Protecting one’s personal information was significantly 
easier prior to the invention of telephones, GPS, and the Internet.  However, it 
 
 6. Keith Allen & Eliott C. McLaughlin, Alexa, Can You Help with This Murder 
Case?, CNN (Dec. 28, 2016, 8:48 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/28/tech/amazon-
echo-alexa-bentonville-arkansas-murder-case-trnd/index.html. 
 7. See id. 
 8. See Solove, supra note 1, at 1084. 
 9. Allen & McLaughlin, supra note 6. 
 10. Id.  The suspect had held a get together at his home, which involved alcohol.  
Id. The next morning, a guest was found floating face-down in the hot tub, and the 
deceased’s blood alcohol content was four times the legal driving limit.  Id.  Investiga-
tors believed there were signs pointing to foul play, so they sought the data from the 
Amazon Echo in hopes to gather more information to solve the case.  Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See id. 
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is still just as important now as it was prior to these technological advancements 
to protect a person’s right to privacy.  To fully understand privacy law today, 
one must possess a background understanding of how it has evolved. 
1. Pre-Olmstead Privacy Law 
The Fourth Amendment provides the first major source for protecting pri-
vacy from law enforcement infringement.  The Fourth Amendment secures 
Americans’ right to “be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.”14  It further requires probable 
cause for warrants.15  This Amendment was intended to guarantee the “privacy, 
dignity, and security of persons against certain arbitrary and invasive acts by 
officers of the government.”16  In its jurisprudence, the United States Supreme 
Court has defined “search” as a government infringement upon “an expectation 
of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable.”17  Additionally, the 
Court has defined a “seizure” of property as “some meaningful interference 
with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.”18  Therefore, as a 
general matter, warrantless searches are “per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment,” although there are a “few specifically established and well-de-
lineated exceptions.”19  “[T]he Fourth Amendment concerns itself with ‘infor-
mational security’ arising from ‘constitutional sources . . . .  ‘Informational 
security’ [refers to] personal information that is secured in some manner from 
governmental intrusion . . . .  ‘[C]onstitutional sources’ means the textually 
referenced, ‘persons, houses, papers, and effects.’”20 
To implicate the Fourth Amendment, a government agent must conduct a 
“search” or “seizure.”21  The first Fourth Amendment case relevant to this topic 
was Boyd v. United States,22 which involved a court order demanding a com-
mercial glass company to produce its private business papers.23  The Court held 
that the order violated the Fourth Amendment because such a demand was an 
“invasion[] on the part of the government . . . of the sanctity of a man’s home 
 
 14. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 15. Id. 
 16. City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 755–56 (2010). 
 17. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); see also Riley v. California, 
134 S. Ct. 2473, 2483 (2014) (discussing the search of a suspect based on probable 
cause and incident to a lawful custodial arrest as such an exception); O’Connor v. Or-
tega, 480 U.S. 709, 725 (1987) (holding that the “special needs” of the workplace jus-
tify one such exception). 
 20. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The “Smart” Fourth Amendment, 102 CORNELL L. 
REV. 547, 604 (2017). 
 21. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 22. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
 23. Id. at 617–18. 
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and the privacies of life.”24  The Court further articulated that it was “not the 
breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitute[d] the 
essence of the offen[s]e[] but [rather] the invasion of [the] indefeasible right of 
personal security, personal liberty and private property, where that right [had] 
never been forfeited by [a] conviction of some public offense . . . .”25 
The Court in Boyd was not focused on a physical harm but rather the harm 
of revealing information.26  Additionally, the focus was not on the company’s 
papers themselves but rather on the content contained in the papers.27  Further, 
the Court distinguished business records from personal records, such as a di-
ary.28  The reach of these “privacies of life” go beyond personal information 
and cover “privately held, but not overtly intimate[,] information.”29  “[T]his 
broad protection . . . was [later] replaced with a more limited, physically-ori-
ented, property-based” framework.30 
2. Olmstead v. United States31 
Although it is hard to imagine life without the various forms of technol-
ogy that influence people each day, the world was not always so technologi-
cally advanced.  There was a time when the telephone was considered a major 
technological advancement.  Even then, telephone users learned that private 
telephone calls could be affected by the surveillance of third-party service pro-
viders and law enforcement.32 
The first major decision regarding surveillance technology was Olmstead 
v. United States,33 where the Court held there is no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in telephone calls when no physical trespass occurs; moreover, the 
Court allowed the warrantless tapping of phone lines.34  In Olmstead, federal 
 
 24. Id. at 630. 
 25. Id. (alteration in original). 
 26. Ferguson, supra note 20, at 569. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 
(1967). 
 32. Wiretapping predates the invention of the telephone.  April White, A Brief 
History of Surveillance in America, SMITHSONIAN.COM (Apr. 2018), 
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/brief-history-surveillance-america-
180968399/.  The first statute prohibiting wiretapping regarded telegraph lines.  Id.  
Prior to the Prohibition, this form of ease-dropping was predominately used by private 
detectives and corporation.  Id.  After the Prohibition hit, law enforcement utilized 
wiretapping, and the Court in 1928 “narrowly affirmed the constitutionality of police 
wiretapping” in Olmstead.  See generally id. 
 33. 277 U.S. 438. 
 34. Id. at 463–66 (“We think, therefore, that the wire tapping here disclosed did 
not amount to a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 4 [2018], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol83/iss4/10
2018] TECHNOLOGY OR PRIVACY 1031 
agents tapped the phone lines of certain individuals suspected of being in-
volved in the unlawful importation, possession, and sale of liquor.35  The Court 
noted that the suspects’ telephone wires were tapped without trespassing on 
any property owned by them, and the information was gathered for many 
months.36  The Court reasoned that the “well-known historical purpose of the 
Fourth Amendment” is to prevent the government from “search[ing] a man’s 
house, his person, his papers, and his effects, and to prevent their seizure 
against his will.”37  However, the Court found the wiretapping did not consti-
tute an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment because there was 
no physical trespass.38 
The Court in Olmstead failed to recognize the parallels between papers 
sent in the mail and electric signals sent along a wire.  While the Court recog-
nized the technological advancement of telephones as compared to communi-
cation through written letters, it was unwilling to extend Fourth Amendment 
protection to this new technology because the Fourth Amendment was thought 
to be limited only to searches and seizures of tangible property.39  Following 
this logic, the Court ruled that there was no search or seizure in listening to the 
telephone calls because the evidence was collected by the agents using only 
their auditory perception.40  Further, the Court reasoned that there was neither 
an “entry of houses or offices of the defendants” nor a “seizure” of any prop-
erty.41 
While the majority did not wish to recognize the technological advance-
ment, Justice Louis D. Brandeis understood that there could be instances in the 
future where technological advancements trigger Fourth Amendment protec-
tion and maintained that Fourth Amendment protections should have been, and 
would eventually need to be, extended further than the literal text of the 
Amendment.42 
3. Post-Olmstead Privacy Law 
The Olmstead decision provided the standard for many years with regard 
to technology and electronic surveillance.  While the Court hesitated to extend 
 
 35. Id. at 455–57. 
 36. Id. at 457. 
 37. Id. at 463. 
 38. Id. at 463–64. 
 39. Id. at 464. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The progress of science in furnishing the 
government with means of espionage is not likely to stop with wire tapping.  Ways may 
some day be developed by which the government, without removing papers from secret 
drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a 
jury the most intimate occurrences of the home.  Advances in the psychic and related 
sciences may bring means of exploring unexpressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions.”). 
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Fourth Amendment rights to intangible invasions,43 it drew a bright-line for 
physical searches.44  Any physical invasion of the structure of the home “by 
even a fraction of an inch” was deemed to be a violation of a person’s rights.45  
For example, in Goldman v. United States,46 a microphone placed on a wall to 
eavesdrop on an adjoining room was not considered a search because no phys-
ical intrusion of a protected space occurred.47  However, under the holding in 
Silverman v. United States, a “spike mike”48 that barely pierced the adjoining 
wall to capture the same conversation was considered a search.49  The Silver-
man Court criticized Olmstead’s reasoning as being overly limiting while ig-
noring technological developments that would soon be capable of invading pri-
vacy without physically trespassing into constitutionally protected spaces.50 
In response to the Olmstead opinion, Congress passed § 605 of the Fed-
eral Communications Act of 193451 to regulate wiretapping.52  However, this 
law was “grossly ineffective” and was far less protective than the Fourth 
Amendment.53  The twentieth century, therefore, saw increased wiretapping 
 
 43. E.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (holding statements 
made to undercover cops do not violate the Fourth Amendment because “[t]he peti-
tioner . . . was not relying on the security of the hotel room; he was relying upon his 
misplaced confidence that [the undercover cop] would not reveal his wrongdoing.”); 
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511–12 (1961) (holding the use of a “spike 
mike” to monitor conversations occurring among individuals with in a home unconsti-
tutional); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134–36 (1942) (holding evidence 
collected by using a detectaphone against an office wall was admissible and did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment because there was no reasonable assumption that con-
versations would be confined within the walls of an office), overruled in part by Katz 
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 44. See Silverman, 365 U.S. at 512. 
 45. Id. 
 46. 316 U.S. at 129. 
 47. Id. at 134–36. 
 48. Silverman, 365 U.S. at 506–07 (“[The spike mike] was a microphone with a 
spike about a foot long attached to, it together with an amplifier, a power pack, and 
earphones.  The officers inserted the spike under a baseboard in a second-floor room of 
the vacant house and into a crevice extending several inches into the party wall, until 
the spike hit something solid ‘that acted as a very good sounding board.’  The record 
clearly indicates that the spike made contact with a heating duct serving the house oc-
cupied by the petitioners thus converting their entire heating system into a conductor 
of sound.”). 
 49. Id. at 511–12. 
 50. Id. at 511 (“In these circumstances we need not pause to consider whether or 
not there was a technical trespass under the local property law relating to party walls.  
Inherent Fourth Amendment rights are not inevitably measurable in terms of ancient 
niceties of tort or real property law.”). 
 51. Federal Communications Commission Act, Pub. L. 73-416, 48 Stat 1064 (cod-
ified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (2018)). 
 52. Solove, supra note 1, at 1086. 
 53. Id. 
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and electronic surveillance, as there was not adequate control and oversight 
when it came to the intersection of surveillance and privacy rights.54 
This era of virtually unrestricted surveillance was upended by Katz v. 
United States,55 wherein the Court overturned Olmstead and held that a warrant 
is necessary to wiretap telephone calls made in public telephone booths.56  In 
Katz, the defendant was in a public telephone booth but did not intend for his 
conversation to be exposed to the public; therefore, the Court held that he had 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the telephone booth.57  The Court wrote, 
“[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.” 58  Therefore, “[w]hat 
a person knowingly exposes to the public, even [if made] in his own home or 
office,” does not receive Fourth Amendment protection.59  However, the Court 
continued, “[W]hat he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible 
to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”60  The Court, after consider-
ing the state of technology in 1967, no longer required a physical invasion to 
constitute a search.61  Additionally, Katz established that searches could occur 
outside of the home and that a physical trespass was no longer necessary to 
find a Fourth Amendment violation.62  However, Katz’s holding was limited to 
the content of telephone conversations.63 
The majority in Katz failed to provide a clear test for deciding future 
Fourth Amendment cases involving technology, however, Justice John Mar-
shall Harlan II’s concurrence proposed a framework for future Fourth Amend-
ment violations.64  This framework consisted of two requirements: “first[,] that 
a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy[,] and 
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘rea-
sonable.’”65  It took many years for Justice Harlan’s framework to gain popu-
larity, but it is now the predominant test that courts utilize when assessing 
 
 54. See id. 
 55. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 56. See id. at 358–59. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 351. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 353. 
 62. Id. at 352–53. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 65. Id. 
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Fourth Amendment issues.66  The majority’s decision established the reasona-
ble expectation of privacy test.67  “By overruling Olmstead, [the Court] . . .  
established the notion that Fourth Amendment analysis must be sensitive to 
both the potential for increasing intrusiveness into conventional activities and 
the evolving landscape of social interchange.”68 
B. The Evolution of the Third-Party Doctrine 
The third-party doctrine weakens Fourth Amendment protections when a 
person voluntarily shares information with a third party, such as the sharing of 
deposit or withdrawal information with a bank or the sharing of dialed tele-
phone numbers with a phone company.69  Once the information is shared, the 
third party is not expected to keep the information secret.70  Therefore, a person 
assumes the risk of private information being shared as soon as he or she shares 
that information with the third party. 
Smart home devices, such as home assistants, operate by storing users’ 
data at third-party locations.  As technology continues to advance, the third-
party doctrine becomes increasingly important for courts to consider when de-
termining how to best protect the privacy of citizens. 
 
 66. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) (“[A] Fourth Amend-
ment search occurs when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy 
that society recognizes as reasonable.”); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39 
(1988) (“The warrantless search and seizure of the garbage bags left at the curb outside 
the Greenwood house would violate the Fourth Amendment only if respondents mani-
fested a subjective expectation of privacy in their garbage that society accepts as ob-
jectively reasonable.”); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (“Consistently 
with Katz, this Court uniformly has held that the application of the Fourth Amendment 
depends on whether the person invoking its protection can claim a ‘justifiable,’ a ‘rea-
sonable,’ or a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ that has been invaded by government 
action.”), superseded by statute, Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. 
L. No. 99–508, 100 Stat. 1848, as recognized in In re Certified Question of Law, 858 
F.3d 591 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2016). 
 67. Katz, 389 U.S. at 359. 
 68. Katherine J. Strandburg, Home, Home on the Web and Other Fourth Amend-
ment Implications of Technosocial Change, 70 MD. L. REV. 614, 629 (2011). 
 69. See Jennifer Lynch, Symposium: Will the Fourth Amendment Protect 21st-
Century Data? The Court Confronts the Third-Party Doctrine, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 2, 
2017), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/08/symposium-will-fourth-amendment-pro-
tect-21st-century-data-court-confronts-third-party-doctrine/. 
 70. Id. 
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1. Early Third-Party Doctrine Cases 
The third-party doctrine is best understood by looking at three major 
cases: Couch v. United States,71 United States v. Miller,72 and Smith v. Mary-
land.73 
In Couch v. United States, the Court held there was no expectation of 
privacy in business records turned over to an accountant because a majority of 
the information was required to be disclosed in an income tax return.74  Here, 
an accountant surrendered business and tax information to the Internal Reve-
nue Service (“IRS”) that he had received for purposes of filing income tax re-
turns for a taxpayer.75  Focusing on the content of the information, the Court 
held that the information handed over to the IRS by the accountant was nothing 
more than what would be reported for income tax return purposes; thus, there 
was no Fourth Amendment violation of privacy in the information.76 
Three years later, in United States v. Miller,77 the Court held there was no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in an individual’s bank records (financial 
statements, deposit slips, etc.), which contained only information “voluntarily 
conveyed” to the bank and exposed to its employees in the ordinary course of 
business.78  Again, the Court focused on the content of the information and 
reached the same result as it did in Couch because it found the defendant had 
no expectation of privacy concerning the information.79  The Court stated, 
“The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the infor-
mation will be conveyed by that person to the Government.”80  Therefore, be-
cause the bank records were voluntarily conveyed in the ordinary course of 
business and there was no expectation of privacy, no Fourth Amendment pro-
tection applied, and no warrant was required.81 
 
 71. 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973). 
 72. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–44 (1976), superseded by statute, 
Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–630, 92 Stat 3641 (codified as 
amended at 12 U.S.C. ch. 35), as recognized in Chao v. Cmty. Tr. Co., 474 F.3d 75, 83 
(3d Cir. 2007). 
 73. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979), superseded by statute, Elec-
tronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–508, 100 Stat. 1848, as 
recognized in In re Certified Question of Law, 858 F.3d 591 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. 
Rev. 2016). 
 74. 409 U.S. at 335. 
 75. Id. at 323–24. 
 76. Id. at 335. 
 77. 425 U.S. 435. 
 78. Id. at 442. 
 79. See id. at 442–43. 
 80. Id. at 443. 
 81. Id. at 444–45. 
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Another three years passed before Smith v. Maryland was decided.82  
There, the Court held that telephone subscribers did not have a legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy in the phone numbers they dialed because users must dis-
close those numbers to the telephone company in order to complete their call.83  
The Court adopted the two-part analysis proposed by Justice Harlan’s concur-
ring opinion in Katz, which considered (1) whether an individual has an actual 
expectation of privacy that he seeks to preserve and (2) whether society recog-
nizes that expectation of privacy as reasonable and justifiable under the cir-
cumstances.84 
As to the first question, the petitioner in Smith argued he had an expecta-
tion of privacy not because of his conduct but because his telephone use oc-
curred in his home.85  However, the Court articulated that the location of the 
call was “immaterial” to Fourth Amendment analysis.86  The Court reasoned 
that while petitioner may have intended to keep the contents of his conversation 
private, his conduct could not preserve the privacy of the number he dialed 
because the telephone company received the number from users in the same 
way, regardless of location.87 
Addressing the second question, the Court pointed out that subscribers 
must understand that phone companies keep permanent records of the phone 
numbers dialed for legitimate business purposes, such as billing, and that those 
numbers appear on the monthly phone bill.88  Because subscribers were aware 
that the telephone company was recording the numbers, the Court found the 
user voluntarily conveyed this information by using the phone.89  The Court 
noted that it “consistently has held that a person has no legitimate expectation 
of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”90  There-
fore, because there was no expectation of privacy where the information was 
voluntarily turned over to a third party, there was no Fourth Amendment pro-
tection, and no warrant was required.91 
Couch, Miller, and Smith establish two distinct propositions regarding the 
third-party doctrine.92  First, voluntarily sharing information with a third party 
eliminates one’s expectation of privacy.93  It follows that once there is no ex-
 
 82. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 83. Id. at 742. 
 84. Id. at 740 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, 
J., concurring)). 
 85. Id. at 743. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 742. 
 89. Id. at 743–44. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 745–46. 
 92. Strandburg, supra note 68, at 638. 
 93. Id. 
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pectation of privacy, a third party can disclose the information to the govern-
ment without a warrant.94  Second, all information stored by a third party is 
subject to the government’s will, even if the third party does not want to turn 
the information over and even if the information is stored temporarily on third-
party servers.95  This information includes “all transaction data, cell phone lo-
cation data, social network information, text messages, and data stored in the 
cloud.”96 
2. Modernization of the Third-Party Doctrine 
As technology advanced from landline telephones to cell phones and 
computers, the third-party doctrine became an increasingly important aspect of 
technology users’ privacy.  However, the United States Supreme Court has not 
accepted technological advancements as willingly as the general public has. 
a. Lack of Clarity: City of Ontario v. Quon 
The Court was hesitant to clarify the concept of privacy expectations in 
communications made on electronic devices owned by a government employer 
in City of Ontario v. Quon.97  Here, the question was whether a police officer’s 
personal text messages sent on his government-owned cell phone were pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment from a search by his government employer.98  
The Court ultimately held that the search was reasonable.99  The Court was 
concerned about what “emerging technology[’s]” role would be in society.100 
The Quon Court looked to the Katz Court for guidance.  The Katz Court 
relied on “its own knowledge and experience” when deciding a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in a phone booth existed.101  However, at the time Quon 
was decided, the Court did not feel it had the necessary knowledge to “elabo-
rate[e] too fully on the Fourth Amendment[’s] implications of emerging tech-
nology.”102  The Court also noted that the “[r]apid changes in the dynamics of 
communication and information transmission” caused similar rapid changes 
“in what society accepts as proper behavior.”103  This holding obscured privacy 
expectations of electronic communications and what is considered reasonable.  
 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 638–39. 
 97. See 560 U.S. 746, 759 (2010). 
 98. See id. at 754; Brief of Respondents at 12, City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 
746 (2010) (No. 08-1332), 2010 WL 989696, at *12. 
 99. Quon, 560 U.S. at 765. 
 100. Id. at 759. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
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The Court avoided the issues of whether the officer had a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in the messages by instead focusing on the impact of office 
policies concerning the use of his government-provided pager.104 
b. Steps in the Right Direction: United States v. Warshak 
In the wake of Quon, courts were uncertain as to how the privacy of elec-
tronic communications should be handled.  Some courts took a narrower inter-
pretation of the third-party doctrine and held there was no expectation of pri-
vacy in non-content information, which is information – such as a telephone 
number or an email address – that is not part of the substance of the communi-
cation.105  However, in United States v. Warshak,106 the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit took a different approach and held that the government’s 
warrantless search of a small business owner’s emails violated the Fourth 
Amendment because “a subscriber enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the contents of emails that are stored with, or sent or received through, [an 
email provider].”107  Applying the Justice Harlan’s two-part analysis in Katz, 
which was adopted in Smith, the court reasoned that Warshak had an expecta-
tion that his emails would be subject to privacy because the emails encom-
passed his “entire business and personal life.”108  The court took into account 
the sensitive nature of the content in the emails and thought it was “highly 
unlikely that Warshak expected [the emails] to be made public.”109  Therefore, 
the court found “Warshak had a subjective expectation of privacy in the con-
tent[] of [the] emails.”110 
In analyzing the second question, the court discussed the “prominent role” 
email has taken in modern communication.111  The court recognized that peo-
ple use email to “instantaneously” send “sensitive and intimate information,” 
 
 104. See id. at 760–61. 
 105. See, e.g., Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 842–47 (11th Cir. 2010) (discussing 
privacy expectations in e-mail and summarizing case law finding no expectation of 
privacy in non-content information); United States v. Bynum, 604 F.3d 161, 164 (4th 
Cir. 2010) (holding that an individual does not have a protectable expectation of privacy 
in electronic subscriber information); United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1204–
05 (10th Cir. 2008) (explaining that there is no Fourth Amendment privacy protection 
in subscriber information sent to Yahoo!); United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 
509–10 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding, by analogy to Smith’s treatment of telephone numbers, 
no protectable privacy interest in non-content information and declining, on qualified 
immunity grounds, to decide whether e-mail content receives Fourth Amendment pro-
tection). 
 106. 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 107. Id. at 288. 
 108. Id. at 284. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
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document online purchases, and discuss confidential business plans.112  The 
court reasoned that if an email address was compromised, one would have ac-
cess to “an account of its owner’s life.”113  Two important principles can be 
extracted from the court’s decision: (1) when information is passed through a 
communications network, it is necessary to make a Fourth Amendment con-
sideration of whether a person’s right to privacy is being violated and (2) it is 
important to interpret the Fourth Amendment in light of evolving technological 
progress, otherwise “its guarantees will wither and perish.”114 
The court made two comparisons to justify its reasoning.  First, letters in 
the mail receive Fourth Amendment protection because a government agent 
cannot read a letter without a warrant.115  Additionally, letters are handled by 
a third-party intermediary, the United States Post Office, and still, an officer 
cannot access a letter in the custody of the Post Office without a warrant.116  
Second, phone calls are handled by a third-party intermediary, the phone com-
pany, and yet, these communications cannot be intercepted by a government 
agent without a warrant.117  Therefore, the court reasoned that, due to the sim-
ilarities between email and traditional forms of communication, such as letters 
and telephone calls, “it would defy common sense to afford emails lesser 
Fourth Amendment protection.”118  Thus, government agents cannot compel a 
third party to turn over contents of an email without a warrant.119 
The Sixth Circuit differentiated its opinion from the United States Su-
preme Court’s opinion in Miller by noting Miller involved simple business rec-
ords, whereas there were confidential personal communications at issue in 
Warshak.120  Additionally, in Warshak the information was not viewed “in the 
ordinary course of business” but rather the third party was an “intermediary . . 
. [and] not the intended recipient.”121  The Court in Warshak understood how 
society treated technology and applied Justice Harlan’s two-step analysis from 
 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 285; see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (reasoning 
technological progress must not be allowed to “erode the privacy guaranteed by the 
Fourth Amendment.”). 
 115. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984) (“Letters and other sealed 
packages are in the general class of effects in which the public at large has a legitimate 
expectation of privacy . . . .”). 
 116. Warshak, 631 F.3d at 285. 
 117. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967). 
 118. Warshak, 631 F.3d at 285–86.  This same reasoning was used by the Ninth 
Circuit in United States v. Forrester.  512 F.3d 500, 511 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The privacy 
interests in [mail and email] are identical.”). 
 119. Warshak, 631 F.3d at 288. 
 120. Id. at 287–88. 
 121. Id. at 288. 
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Katz, as adopted in Smith, in reaching a result that protected electronic com-
munications.122  This bold analysis was a sign that the future of the third-party 
doctrine may be evolving to accept a more technology-friendly standard. 
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
In 2012, the United States Supreme Court first indicated that it recognized 
the need for the third-party doctrine to be reevaluated to better assess privacy 
rights in relation to new technological advancements.  In United States v. 
Jones,123 the Court held that Global Positioning System (“GPS”) monitoring 
constituted a search because it involved the government’s trespass onto private 
property “for the purpose of obtaining information.”124  While the opinion itself 
did not implicate the third-party doctrine, five Justices, in concurring opinions, 
indicated a willingness to rethink parts of the doctrine.125  Specifically, Justice 
Sonia M. Sotomayor noted that, given the continuing evolution of technology, 
“it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third 
parties.”126  She went on to say the third-party doctrine is 
ill-suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of infor-
mation about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out 
mundane tasks.  People disclose the phone numbers that they dial or 
text to their cellular providers; the URLs that they visit and the e-mail 
addresses with which they correspond to their Internet service provid-
ers; and the books, groceries, and medications they purchase to online 
retailers.127 
Additionally, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. articulated that “[n]ew technol-
ogy may provide increased convenience or security at the expense of privacy, 
and many people may find the tradeoff worthwhile.  And even if the public 
does not welcome the diminution of privacy that new technology entails, they 
may eventually reconcile themselves to this development as inevitable.”128 
Following the Jones concurrences, “state and federal courts have increas-
ingly rejected the government’s attempts to extend Smith to new forms of 
 
 122. Id. at 285. 
 123. 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
 124. Id. at 404–05. 
 125. See id. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 427–28 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 126. Id. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 427 (Alito, J., concurring). 
14
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 4 [2018], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol83/iss4/10
2018] TECHNOLOGY OR PRIVACY 1041 
data.”129  For example, in United States v. Graham,130 the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit held that a warrantless, extended collection of de-
fendants’ cell-site data by the government was an unconstitutional search, but 
this holding was later reversed en banc.131  In United States v. Davis,132 the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in “even one point of cell[-]site location data,” but this holding was 
also reversed en banc.133  Further, eleven state supreme courts134 have explic-
itly rejected the third-party doctrine, and ten135 others have indicated a possi-
bility of doing so in the future.136  However, the reversals of Graham and Davis 
show that the United States Supreme Court must be the first to update the third-
party doctrine before lower courts will be able to do so. 
Some thought the Court would update the doctrine with its decision of 
Riley v. California.137  The Court in Riley held that a warrant was required to 
search a cell phone when the cell phone was seized incident to an arrest.138  In 
so holding, the Court declined to extend the traditional Fourth Amendment ex-
ception for searches incident to arrest,139 as established by United States v. 
Robinson.140  In Robinson, the Court upheld the search of a cigarette pack re-
covered incident to an arrest.141  The question in Riley was whether searching 
 
 129. Hanni Fakhoury, Smith v. Maryland Turns 35, but Its Health Is Declining, 
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (June 24, 2014), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/06/smith-v-maryland-turns-35-its-healths-declin-
ing. 
 130. 796 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2015), reh’g granted 824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016), 
abrogated by Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
 131. Id. at 338. 
 132. 754 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2014), reheard and vacated by 785 F.3d 498 (11th 
Cir. 2015). 
 133. Id. at 1216. 
 134. The state supreme courts in California, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illi-
nois, Montana, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Washington have all rejected the 
federal third-party doctrine.  Stephen E. Henderson, Learning from All Fifty States: 
How to Apply the Fourth Amendment and Its State Analogs to Protect Third Party In-
formation from Unreasonable Search, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 373, 395 tbl.1 (2006). 
 135. The state supreme courts in Alaska, Arkansas, Indiana, Massachusetts, Min-
nesota, New Hampshire, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, and Vermont have indicated 
that they might reject the federal third-party doctrine.  Id. at 395 tbl.2. 
 136. Id. at 376.  These numbers are based on Henderson’s survey of cases surround-
ing this topic in each state.  Id. 
 137. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
 138. Id. at 2495. 
 139. Clifford S. Fishman, Searching Cell Phones After Arrest: Exceptions to the 
Warrant and Probable Cause Requirements, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 995, 1002 (2013) 
(“Police may conduct a search without first obtaining a warrant ‘when the exigencies 
of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless 
search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.’”). 
 140. 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
 141. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484 (citing Robinson, 414 U.S. at 236). 
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a smart phone could be considered an invasion of privacy equivalent to the 
search of a cigarette pack and whether the amount of personal data stored on 
the smart phone changed the analysis.142  In making its decision, the Court 
assessed, on the one hand, “the degree to which [the search] intrudes upon an 
individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which [the search] is 
needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”143 
The Court noted that law enforcement officials are permitted “to examine 
the physical aspects of a phone to ensure that it will not be used as a weapon”144 
but cannot examine its contents.145  The Court reasoned that data on cell phones 
differs in both a “quantitative and a qualitative sense” from other objects that 
an arrestee may carry.146  The Court deemed this an important issue because 
“many of the more than [ninety percent] of American adults who own cell 
phones keep on their person a digital record of nearly every aspect of their 
lives.”147  The Court noted that privacy interests were further complicated be-
cause data that appears to be stored on cell phones may actually be stored on a 
remote server that is maintained and operated by a third party.148 
The government, relying on Smith, presented the argument that police 
should at least be able to look at the cell phone’s call log.149  However, the 
Court rejected this argument and distinguished cell phone call logs from the 
call logs discussed in Smith because cell phone “call logs typically contain 
more than just [a] phone number[].”150  This reasoning implies that the more 
informative the information is, the more it should be entitled to Fourth Amend-
ment protection.  The Court reasoned that “[t]he fact that technology now al-
lows an individual to carry such information in his hand does not make the 
information any less worthy of the protection for which the Founders 
fought.”151  Recognizing the need for police to search cell phones in appropri-
ate instances, the Court held that police officers must first get a warrant before 
searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest.152 
While Riley represented a step in the right direction with regard to how 
technology is treated under the Fourth Amendment, its holding is relatively 
 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)). 
 144. Id. at 2485. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 2489 (“One of the most notable distinguishing features of modern cell 
phones is their immense storage capacity.”). 
 147. Id. at 2490 (alteration in original) (“Indeed, a cell phone search would typically 
expose to the government far more than the most exhaustive search of a house: A phone 
not only contains in digital form many sensitive records previously found in the home; 
it also contains a broad array of private information never found in a home in any form 
– unless the phone is.”). 
 148. Id. at 2491. 
 149. Id. at 2492. 
 150. Id. at 2492–93. 
 151. Id. at 2495. 
 152. Id. 
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narrow because it is limited to searches incident to arrest.153  Even so, the 
Court’s dicta was monumental regarding the modernization of the third-party 
doctrine. 
In Carpenter v. United States,154 the Court held that, in narrow circum-
stances,155 information held by third parties may still be subject to Fourth 
Amendment protection.156  Here, four men were arrested in connection with a 
string of armed robberies.157  One of the men confessed and gave police his 
personal cell phone number and the cell phone numbers of the others allegedly 
involved.158  The prosecutors used this information to apply for court orders – 
not warrants – under the Stored Communications Act159 to obtain records for 
Carpenter and the other suspects from each of their respective cell phone car-
riers.160  The orders were granted for Carpenter’s carriers to disclose cell-site 
sector information at “call origination and at call termination for incoming and 
outgoing calls” during the designated time period.161  Based on the recovered 
information, Carpenter was charged and convicted.162  When Carpenter chal-
lenged the government’s use of the cell-site information without a warrant, the 
 
 153. Id. at 2489 n.1 (alteration in original) (“[T]hese cases involve searches inci-
dent to arrest, these cases do not implicate the question whether the collection or in-
spection of aggregated digital information amounts to a search under other circum-
stances.”). 
 154. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
 155. Id. at 2220 (“Our decision today is a narrow one.  We do not express a view 
on matters not before us: real-time [cell-site location information] or ‘tower dumps’ (a 
download of information on all the devices that connected to a particular cell-site during 
a particular interval).  We do not disturb the application of Smith and Miller or call into 
question conventional surveillance techniques and tools, such as security cameras.  Nor 
do we address other business records that might incidentally reveal location infor-
mation.  Further, our opinion does not consider other collection techniques involving 
foreign affairs or national security.”). 
 156. Id. at 2222. 
 157. Id. at 2212. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Stored Communications Act, Pub. L. No. 99–508, 100 Stat 1848 (1986) 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§2701–2712 (2018)); see also HANNAH BLOCH-
WEHBA & JENNIFER R. HENRICHSEN, ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS SURVEILLANCE: 
WHAT JOURNALISTS AND MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS NEED TO KNOW 10 (2017), 
https://www.rcfp.org/wp-content/uploads/imported/SURVEILLANCE.pdf (“The 
Stored Communications Act authorizes the government to require providers of elec-
tronic communications services to disclose both the substantive contents of stored 
communications as well as the metadata records associated with those communica-
tions (e.g., email dates, times, and header information, including ‘to’ and ‘from’ ad-
dresses).”).  
 160. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 2212–13. 
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Sixth Circuit held that he had no expectation of privacy in the information be-
cause this information was shared with a third party: his wireless carriers.163 
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the Court compared the 
cell-site data to that of GPS monitoring, which resulted in “detailed, encyclo-
pedic, and effortlessly compiled” information.164  The Court acknowledged the 
third-party doctrine and further acknowledged that Carpenter continuously re-
vealed his location to his carrier.165  However, the Court declined to extend 
Smith and Miller because it determined that detailed information, such as the 
cell-site data, belonged in a “qualitatively different category” than telephone 
numbers or bank records.166  Unlike GPS monitoring, a cell phone is “almost 
a feature of human anatomy . . . [which] tracks nearly exactly the movements 
of its owner.” 167  No matter who the suspect may be, it is as if “he has effec-
tively been tailed every moment of every day for five years,” and “[o]nly the 
few [people] without cell phones could [avoid] this tireless and absolute sur-
veillance.”168 
The fact that the cell-site information was held by a third party did not 
eliminate Carpenter’s claim to Fourth Amendment protection, even though the 
records were business records created and maintained by the wireless carri-
ers.169  The location data was not truly voluntarily shared, as cell phones con-
tinuously log cell-site data with “no affirmative act on the part of the user be-
yond powering up.”170  The Court reasoned that the key consideration was the 
“deeply revealing nature” of the information as well as its “depth, breadth, . . . 
comprehensive reach, and the inescapable and automatic nature of its collec-
tion.”171  Therefore, the cell-site data that prosecutors had obtained without a 
warrant was classified as a search subject to Fourth Amendment protection.172 
However, the Court was careful to note that its narrow decision did not 
disturb the application of Smith and Miller or “call into question conventional 
surveillance techniques and tools, such as security cameras” or “business rec-
ords that might incidentally reveal location information.”173 
IV. DISCUSSION 
Under the current framework, smart home device data lacks Fourth 
Amendment protection.  However, recent cases show that the United States 
 
 163. Id. at 2213. 
 164. Id. at 2216. 
 165. Id. at 2216–17. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 2218 (citation omitted). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 2216–17. 
 170. Id. at 2220. 
 171. Id. at 2223. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 2221. 
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Supreme Court may be willing to take another look at the third-party doctrine 
in order to uphold Fourth Amendment protections in light of these technologi-
cal advancements. 
A. Smart Home Devices Under the Current Third-Party Doctrine and 
Privacy Law 
People in the Information Age have the ability “to communicate, transfer 
and share information[, and] access data” from anywhere.174  Smart home de-
vices are in their early stages but can already control lights, televisions, ther-
mostats, and monitor a home to ensure it is maintained in an efficient and safe 
manner.  These devices provide several benefits, such as offering a higher 
standard of living for relatively low costs, assisting the elderly or disabled, and 
providing a sense of security.  The merchants who produce these devices store 
user data with the intention of using the data to access devices remotely, de-
velop their products, and turn a profit by selling the data to advertisers.  These 
devices can make day-to-day lives easier for all who choose to use them.  But 
many consumers do not realize the consequences that stem from allowing such 
data collection in their homes.175  Three main consequences are “(1) the effect 
on individual behavior and well-being, (2) the effect on corporations and their 
ability to do business in new and unusual ways, and (3) the effect on govern-
ment action.”176 
The third-party doctrine, as it currently stands, implies that a majority of 
information provided by a user to a third party loses Fourth Amendment pro-
tection under the reasonable expectation of privacy theory.177  This doctrine’s 
rationale is that by giving the information to a third party, the giver loses the 
right to privacy in that information.  “[A] person has no legitimate expectation 
of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”178  Thus, 
by using smart home devices, a user voluntarily turns over personal data to 
third parties. 
For example, consider a voice assistant device, such as the Amazon Echo 
or Google Home.  These devices control music and lighting, order products, 
 
 174. Solove, supra note 1, at 1088. 
 175. See Jillisa Bronfman, Weathering the Nest: Privacy Implications of Home 
Monitoring for the Aging American Population, 14 DUKE L. & TECH. REV., 192, 192–
93 (2016). 
 176. Id. at 193–94. 
 177. Ferguson, supra note 20, at 575. 
 178. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979), superseded by statute, Elec-
tronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–508, 100 Stat. 1848, as 
recognized in In re Certified Question of Law, 858 F.3d 591 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. 
Rev. 2016); see also United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–44 (1976), superseded 
by statute, Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–630, 92 Stat 3641 
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. ch. 35), as recognized in Chao v. Cmty. Tr. Co., 474 
F.3d 75, 83 (3d Cir. 2007). 
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and even answer questions merely by using a “wake word”179 followed by the 
desired command.180  When a user makes a request, the voice assistant records 
the user’s speech, transmits the recording to its home server to correctly pro-
cess the request, and stores the recording on the company’s servers.181  For the 
device to recognize a “wake word” when used, the device must always be lis-
tening.182  Some brands of devices overwrite background chatter data that is 
not associated with a request, while others store all the data.183  Surveillance 
systems operate similarly.  For example, the “Nest Cam” records and transmits 
data continuously until it is manually turned off.184  Under the current third-
party doctrine, these devices essentially eliminate Fourth Amendment protec-
tions associated with the home by voluntarily conveying data to a third party.  
Therefore, police could gain access to the data without a warrant because gain-
ing access would likely not constitute a search under the current third-party 
doctrine.185 
These devices seem somewhat similar to the cell-site data discussed in 
Carpenter.  The most important similarity is that users have little to no control 
over data being shared to the third party.  Data automatically transmits by 
merely turning on many of these devices.  Smart water meters, smart watches, 
some brands of home assistants, and home video security systems are always 
listening and/or recording.186  Some of this data is also “deeply revealing in 
 
 179. A wake word is a word that tells the smart home device the user is specifically 
talking to the device.  This word puts the smart home device on notice that the user is 
about to give a command. 
 180. Rich Jaroslovsky, Google Home vs. Amazon Echo Is a Battle of Smarts and 
Skills, OBSERVER (Jan. 17, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://observer.com/2017/01/google-
home-versus-amazon-echo-review/. 
 181. Christopher Mele, Bid for Access to Amazon Echo Audio in Murder Case 
Raises Privacy Concerns, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2016), https://www.ny-
times.com/2016/12/28/business/amazon-echo-murder-case-arkansas.html. 
 182. Id. 
 183. See, e.g., Mele, supra note 181; Michael Justin Allen Sexton, Cortana Is Lis-
tening, TOM’S HARDWARE (Aug. 10, 2015, 2:00 PM), http://www.tomshard-
ware.com/news/cortana-is-watching,29791.html. 
 184. STACEY GRAY, FUTURE OF PRIVACY FORUM, ALWAYS ON: PRIVACY 
IMPLICATIONS OF MICROPHONE-ENABLED DEVICES 6 (2016), https://fpf.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2016/04/FPF_Always_On_WP.pdf. 
 185. See generally Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973); Smith v. Mary-
land, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979), superseded by statute, Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–508, 100 Stat. 1848, as recognized in In re Certi-
fied Question of Law, 858 F.3d 591 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2016); United States 
v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–44 (1976), superseded by statute, Right to Financial Pri-
vacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–630, 92 Stat 3641 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. 
ch. 35), as recognized in Chao v. Cmty. Tr. Co., 474 F.3d 75, 83 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 186. See Larry Greenemeier, Alexa, What Are You Doing with My Family’s Per-
sonal Info?, SCI. AM. (Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.scientificamerican.com/arti-
cle/alexa-what-are-you-doing-with-my-familys-personal-info/. 
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nature,” as in Carpenter.187  Home assistants record all conversations occurring 
in a home, when users are home, users’ likes and dislikes, and users’ personal 
preferences.188 
However, these devices likely do not fall under the narrow holding of 
Carpenter because there are key differences between smart home devices and 
cell-site date.  The most important difference is that, unlike cell phones, these 
devices do not follow an individual’s every movement.  Devices such as home 
assistants can only pick up on what can be heard in a certain location of a home.  
Another key difference is that, unlike cell phones, smart home devices are not 
nearly as common.  The United States has a population of 326 million people 
and 396 million cell phone service accounts,189 with ninety-five percent of 
Americans owning a cell phone.190  The Court understands that cell phones are 
a way of life and that it is difficult to function in our society without a cell 
phone.  In contrast, estimates suggest there are a total of 40.3 million smart 
homes in the United States.191  This estimate includes devices that assist with 
home entertainment, control and connectivity, energy management, comfort 
and lighting, smart appliances, and security.192  Even with all of these catego-
ries combined, smart devices are vastly less popular in 2018 than cell 
phones.193  However, every year the number of smart homes continues to in-
crease.194  Sixty-nine million homes are predicted to be smart homes by 
2022.195 
Cell phones were once the new, up-and-coming technology.  However, it 
is only after ninety-five percent of Americans were recognized as using cell 
phones that courts started to interpret the Fourth Amendment to catch up with 
the privacy issues surrounding these devices.  Smart home devices are on a 
fast-upward trend and will likely soon be just as common as cell phones are 
today.  For this reason, it is important to prepare for the reality of the future.  
Smart home device data is very valuable, as it can give insights into who a 
person is, how a person behaves, what tastes a person has, and what a person’s 
intentions are.  When this data is in the hands of companies interested in selling 
products, this exchange of information may not seem concerning; however, 
when this data is in the hands of government and law enforcement officials, 
there may be significant concerns. 
 
 187. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018). 
 188. GRAY, supra note 184, at 6, 10. 
 189. Id. at 2223. 
 190. Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 2, 2018), http://www.pewinter-
net.org/fact-sheet/mobile/. 
 191. Smart Home, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/outlook/279/109/smart-
home/united-states (last visited Oct.16, 2018). 
 192. See id. 
 193. Compare Mobile Fact Sheet, supra note 190 (stating that ninety-five percent 
of Americans own smart phones as of 2018), with Smart Home, supra note 191 (stating 
that current smart home penetration is thirty-two percent). 
 194. Smart Home, supra note 191. 
 195. Id. 
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Police have used data from Fitbits,196 home video surveillance,197 smart 
water meters, cell phones, and much more to gather evidence for cases.198  The 
data on many smart home devices is only as protected as the third party holding 
the information desires.  For example, in the murder investigation discussed 
supra, if Amazon’s policies had been different, there would have been nothing 
stopping it from handing over the data to police – with or without a warrant.199  
Once the information is out, a user no longer has the power to control who can 
see or use the information.  Users are left depending on the third parties col-
lecting this information to have policies in place that protect their private in-
formation.  This is worrisome, as smart home devices become more common 
in daily lives and many users are uninformed as to the possible ramifications 
of using these devices. 
B. Updating the Third-Party Doctrine to Reflect Fourth Amendment 
Protections 
When it comes to smart home devices, there are two main privacy rights 
at issue: (1) the right to exercise control over a user’s personal information and 
(2) the right to notice and consent for the distribution of such personal infor-
mation – i.e., the right to be free from abuse of private data.  To protect these 
important rights, the third-party doctrine should provide a framework that re-
flects the technologies available – technologies that allow third parties access 
to a person’s home and to his or her most private information in ways that could 
not have been fathomed at the time the Fourth Amendment was written.200  
Over the years, the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth 
Amendment to protect a person’s right to privacy beyond the pre-technological 
world that existed at the time the Constitution was ratified.201  This included 
 
 196. Amanda Watts, Cops Use Murdered Woman’s Fitbit to Charge Her Husband, 
CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2017/04/25/us/fitbit-womans-death-investigation-trnd/in-
dex.html (last updated Apr. 26, 2017, 2:58 PM). 
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ernment. 
 198. See, e.g., Watts, supra note 196; Kathryn Gilker, Bentonville Police Use Smart 
Water Meters as Evidence in Murder Investigation, 5NEWS (Dec. 28, 2016), 
https://5newsonline.com/2016/12/28/bentonville-police-use-smart-water-meters-as-
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Track Cellphones to Solve Routine Crimes, USA TODAY (Aug. 24, 2015), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/08/23/baltimore-police-stingray-cell-sur-
veillance/31994181/.  
 199. See supra text accompanying notes 10–13. 
 200. See Ferguson, supra note 20, at 566. 
 201. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2477 (2014) (smartphones); 
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34–37 (2001) (interior of home from thermal im-
agers); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716 (1984) (beepers); Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52 (1967) (telephones). 
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expanding the Fourth Amendment’s protections to cars, telephones, and track-
ing devices.202  Carpenter represented a step in the right direction; however, as 
with Riley, it has a narrow holding that still leaves many types of private data 
vulnerable under the current third-party doctrine. 
The United States Supreme Court has made the following two principles 
clear in its jurisprudence.  First, the home is a private space where a person has 
a right to “retreat . . . and there be free from unreasonable governmental intru-
sion.”203  Second, “[W]hat [a person] seeks to preserve as private, even in an 
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”204  When read 
together, these principles support the following conclusion: Even though the 
data collected by smart home devices is stored by third parties, it is intended to 
be private and can only be collected from inside the home.  Therefore, if a 
“state’s corresponding obligation to respect the home’s ‘wellbeing, tranquility, 
and privacy’ is an interest ‘of the highest order in a free and civilized soci-
ety,’”205 then the data collected via smart home devices should receive the same 
protection as telephone calls. 
In Jones, Justice Sotomayor and Justice Alito focused on the personal in-
formation revealed from the GPS device at issue in their concurrences.206  
There, the procurement of the tracking information was considered a search 
based solely on the informational exposure that resulted – it was not about the 
car itself but rather about the information that was conferred based on the car’s 
travels.  The majority’s discussion in Riley and Justice Sotomayor’s concurring 
opinion in Jones foreshadow the future of the third-party doctrine and Fourth 
Amendment protections in the context of technological advancements. 
Technology in the twenty-first century goes above and beyond the tech-
nology in existence at the time Smith was decided.  The type of information 
being conveyed by these devices is vastly more personal and private than the 
mere dialing of phone numbers.  Smart devices can potentially record every 
conversation in a home and store it for an unlimited amount of time.207  The 
companies storing this data can create a profile for users, including: 
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health profile (health monitoring apps), whereabouts (calendar), activi-
ties (to-do lists), political leanings (which news sites [he/she] fre-
quents), and even possibly innermost thoughts (think of the one-off 
Google or WebMD searches you would prefer not to broadcast).208 
This is not the content-less type of information discussed in Smith.  There, 
the information did not contain content – it merely contained numbers.209  
Therefore, there was no reasonable expectation of privacy, whereas, the data at 
issue with smart home devices contains a vast amount of personal information, 
which, under the current framework, cannot be protected by a user.210 
This data should be protected, and a warrant should be required to access 
this information because of the amount of sensitive material that these smart 
home devices transmit.  In Jones, it was not the car but the information gained 
from the car that was a problematic invasion of privacy.  Here, it is not the 
home but the information gained from inside the home through technology that 
poses a grave threat to Fourth Amendment protections of persons across the 
country.  Before modern technology, personal documents and records were 
stored in the home or at the office – such as financial records, health records, 
personal letters, photographs, and more.  These documents are now stored elec-
tronically on a computer and are likely backed up to a “cloud.”211  Twenty-
first-century technology expands beyond the walls of the home, and the most 
intimate details of people’s lives are stored in electronic databases that cannot 
be contained within the physical boundary of the home. 
The traditional reasonable expectation of privacy test, which focuses on 
the physical boundaries of the home and office with exceptions for publicly 
disclosed information, can be “reconceptualized as only protecting the infor-
mation secured . . . from others.”212  Under this traditional doctrine, the concept 
of privacy would be constrained to what is “inside” the device rather than in-
cluding the device itself.  Therefore, individuals could only claim a reasonable 
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expectation of privacy by taking steps to protect that information; this is largely 
because voluntarily disclosing the information means it would no longer fall 
under the Fourth Amendment’s protection. 
The groundwork for reconceptualizing the reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy test has already been laid, as the third-party doctrine’s underlying princi-
ple focuses on the content of the information shared.213  For example, in Smith, 
the Court concluded that the phone numbers at issue did not constitute sensitive 
information and that no Fourth Amendment violation had occurred.214  In so 
concluding, the Court differentiated the facts of Smith from Katz, noting that 
the content of the phone calls was not recorded.215  Further, in Miller, the fi-
nancial documents were available to all bank employees in the ordinary course 
of business, and therefore, the Court held such documents did not contain “sen-
sitive” information.  Additionally, in Carpenter, the Court focused solely on 
the type of information at issue and whether a user had a lack of control over 
the transmission of that information.  The holdings of the Court in each of these 
cases turned on what type of content was being conferred and not what physical 
boundaries were being implicated. 
In the Information Age, it is becoming increasingly difficult to decline 
turning over personal information because “[w]e must ‘plug in’ to join in. . . . 
[W]e must establish relationships with a panoply of companies.”216  So, when 
hearing cases that involve smart home devices and the third-party doctrine, the 
Court should apply the reasonable expectation of privacy test and look at the 
specific type of content in question.  Only then should the Court determine 
whether the type of information at issue holds an expectation of privacy. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The third-party doctrine has existed for many years.  It has survived the 
ever-evolving changes of technology into the twenty-first century.  However, 
as information-sharing technologies – like smart home devices – become more 
prevalent, it becomes necessary to update the third-party doctrine to preserve 
the integrity of the Fourth Amendment right to privacy.  Justice Sotomayor 
stated in her concurring opinion in Jones that the third-party doctrine is “ill-
suited to the digital age.”217  Further, Justice Alito articulated in his concurring 
opinion in Jones, “[E]ven if the public does not welcome the diminution of 
privacy that new technology entails, they may eventually reconcile themselves 
to this development as inevitable.”218  Justice Alito understood that a person 
should not be forced to choose between participating in modern life and main-
taining one’s right to privacy with respect to his or her personal information. 
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When looking back at the cases that developed the third-party doctrine, it 
is clear that these cases were based on careful inquiries into the type of infor-
mation being conveyed.  This reasoning should not be overlooked when con-
sidering cases involving future technologies.  The United States Supreme 
Court’s time as an idle observer of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in the 
Information Age must come to an abrupt end; the time for the Court to once 
again step into the arena of individual privacy and return the analysis to a con-
text-specific framework that will appropriately account for continually evolv-
ing technology is now. 
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